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Abstract: With data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted with artisanal 
fishing communities in Colombia, we estimate a hierarchical linear model to investigate within-
group and between-group variation in individual harvest strategies across several institutions. 
Our results suggest that communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies 
within groups, but that these coordinated strategies vary considerably across groups. In contrast, 
weakly enforced regulatory restrictions on individual harvests (as well as unregulated open 
access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these 
strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation. 
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In many economics experiments, individual subjects are assigned to a particular group and are 
then asked to make a sequence of decisions over multiple rounds.  In a multi-period game, 
clearly the observations generated by a single individual are not independent, and the repeated 
measures are usually captured with random effects models.  However, the hierarchical, or nested, 
structure of the data implies that the observations from different individuals within a group are 
also unlikely to be statistically independent.   
  Hierarchical linear models can be used to model both groups and individuals as random 
effects.
1 These types of models are commonly used, for example, in educational performance 
studies with pupils nested within schools, in family studies with children nested within families, 
and medical research with patients nested within hospitals (Singer 1998, Hox 1998, Boyle and 
Willms 2001). These models provide statistically efficient estimates of regression coefficients 
(Goldstein 1995), they avoid misleading standard errors, confidence intervals and significance 
                                                 
1 Hierarchical linear models are also known as “multilevel regression models.”   3
tests produced by when one fails to account for clustered data (Hox 1998), and they allow the 
analyst to decompose the explained variance in the dependent variable by level of hierarchy—
which is the primary focus of this paper.
2   
  Our interest in using hierarchical linear models is to gain a deeper understanding of the 
effects of alternative institutions designed to promote more conservative choices in common pool 
resource experiments than one can obtain from a random effects model that fails to account for 
the nested structure of the data. We ask whether accounting for group effects can explain 
individual decisions for particular institutions, and, more importantly, how these effects may 
vary across institutions.  We conducted a series of common pool resource experiments with 
artisanal fishermen in rural Colombia. Each group of five subjects first played 10 rounds of a 
standard open access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of 
three institutions. One institution allowed subject to communicate between rounds. This 
treatment is meant to capture the effects of informal non-binding agreements on individual 
harvests.
3  Under the other two institutions, subjects could not communicate. Instead, they faced 
an exogenously imposed quota restriction on their harvests, which was enforced with random 
monitoring and a unit penalty for exceeding the quota.  These two regulatory institutions were 
identical except that they had different marginal penalties for noncompliance to the quota.  
 We find that each of the three second-stage institutions motivated individuals toward 
more conservative exploitation of the resource than under the baseline open access treatment. In 
fact, mean harvest levels in the second-stage treatments were statistically indistinguishable. 
                                                 
2 To our knowledge, hierarchical linear models have rarely been used to analyze data from economics experiments. 
Exceptions include Kurzban et al. (2001), and Messer et al. (2005). However, these papers do not analyze the 
relative importance of within-group and between-group variation in individual choices or how these values may 
change with different experimental treatments. 
3  For a recent review of the effects of communication in common pool experiments see Cardenas, Ahn and Ostrom 
2003.    4
Stopping at this point, however, would make us miss a rich story about the underlying variation 
in individual choices that led to these similar outcomes. Our application of a hierarchical linear 
model yields estimates of between-group and within-group variances that differ in important 
ways across the institutions. Under open access and the two regulatory institutions, the variation 
in individual harvests is explained more by differences within groups than by differences 
between groups. The opposite occurs under the communication treatment: while the within-
group variation is quite low in this treatment, the between-group variation is significant.  
Under open access and the regulatory institutions, individuals made their choices in 
private, and hence, were not subject to the direct influence of others in their group. Under these 
conditions, we expect that individuals with different preferences will formulate different 
strategies. Individuals may be Nash maximizers, altruists, conformists, reciprocators, etc., and 
several of these “types” are likely to be represented in any given group.
4 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that subject heterogeneity would lead to a high degree of within-group variation in 
individual choices in our non-communication treatments. That we also observe low between-
group variation in these treatments suggests that the composition of individual “types” is roughly 
replicated across groups.  
Communication, on the other hand, can serve as a mechanism to share information about 
the problem at hand, while bringing social pressure to bear on individuals to achieve more 
efficient outcomes. In this way, communication can lead to informal agreements among group 
members that are non-binding, but nevertheless serve to coordinate individual actions.  Our 
results suggest that this coordination function of communication led to low within-group 
                                                 
4 Several authors have sought to account for different individual “types” in public goods experiments, including 
Offerman et al. (1996), Keser and Van Winden (2000), Brandts and Scharm (2001), Brosig (2001), Fischbacher et 
al. (2001), Cason et al. (2004), Kurzban and Houser (2005). See Casari and Plot (2003) for an attempt to classify 
individual types in a common pool experiment.   5
variation in individual choices. However, we simultaneously observe significant between-group 
variation in individual choices, suggesting a high degree of heterogeneity in the coordinated 
strategies that different groups are able to formulate and maintain.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiments are based on the standard problem of individual harvests from a common pool 
resource by n identical individuals. Individual payoffs were derived from a model that is similar 
to that presented by Ostrom et al. (1994), and an earlier model developed by Cornes and Sandler 
(1983). Individual i harvests xi units up to a capacity constraint  .
max
i x  Units of harvest sell at a 
constant price p. The individual’s harvest costs are  () () ii i ii cx x d x x x − − + ++ , where 
ij ji x x − ≠ =∑ , and c and d are positive constants. The individual has an endowment ei. Thus, 
individual payoffs are: 
 () () , ii i i i i i i ep xc xx d x xx π −− =+ − + − + subject to  .
max
ii x x ≤    [1] 
      The experiments were conducted in rural villages of Colombia during the summer of 2004 in 
communities in which the primary activity is artisanal fishing. Rather than use a neutral frame, 
we were explicit that the experiments concerned harvest decisions from a shared fishery.
5 A total 
of 180 individuals participated in our experiments, divided into 36 groups of five.
6  Each subject 
received an identical payoff table that was generated from [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c = 
                                                 
5 Within their recent taxonomy of field experiments, Harrison and List (2004) would classify our experiments as 
framed field experiments, because our experiments are conducted with a population of subjects for which the 
phenomenon of interest to us (behavior in a common pool fishery) is also an important element of the subjects’ 
experiences.  
6 Assignment to groups was not completely random. We tried to ensure that relatives were in separate groups.    6
17.875, d = 2.75, ei = 900,  0
min = i x  and 
max 8. i x =
7 With these values, the standard symmetric 
Nash equilibrium is achieved when each individual chooses to harvest six units, while the 
efficient choice is one unit. 
Subjects played a total of 20 rounds, divided into a pair of 10-round stages. For all 36 
groups, the first stage was a typical unregulated common pool resource game (Open Access). In 
the second stage, we introduced one of the following three institutions (with 12 groups in each): 
face-to-face verbal communication (Com); external regulation with a low penalty (Low Penalty) 
or a medium penalty (Mid Penalty). In the Com treatment, each round participants were free to 
discuss the experiments prior to making their harvest decisions privately.   
For the two treatments with an external regulation, an individual harvest quota of one unit 
(the efficient outcome) was imposed. To enforce the quota, each subject faced an audit 
probability of 10 percent.
8  If an inspection revealed that a subject’s harvest exceeded the quota, 
then that person incurred a financial penalty. The results of inspections were not made public.  
The two regulatory treatments differ only in the level of the unit penalty for discovered 
violations of the harvest quota. For the Low Penalty treatment, the fine was 27 pesos for each 
unit above the quota. With this penalty, the resulting marginal expected penalty is insufficient to 
change the pure Nash strategy equilibrium from the baseline Open Access harvest of six units per 
person. Nevertheless, such a regulation might serve to reduce individual harvests because of the 
frame the regulation places on the experiment, in particular the signal of efficient choices and 
                                                 
7 Experiment instructions, including the payoff table, are available upon request.  <INCLUDED AS 
REVIEWER’S APPENDIX>. In the experiments, participants were asked to choose a harvest level between one 
and nine units, instead of between zero and eight. The reason for this shift is that the concept of zero harvest is very 
difficult to explain in the field since the participants depend so critically on their use of local natural resources. The 
payoff table they were given was modified to account for this. However, our analysis assumes that individual 
harvests vary from zero and eight. 
8 To decide who in a group, if anyone, was inspected in a particular round, a ballot was chosen (with replacement) 
from a bag containing five ballots containing the participants’ numbers and five blank ballots.    7
that deviations from the quota will be sanctioned. The Mid Penalty treatment involved the same 
regulatory frame, but the marginal penalty for violations of the quota was 165 pesos. A 
conventional model of regulatory enforcement predicts that this penalty would motivate subjects 
to reduce their harvests to five units. 
In addition to deciding upon a level of harvest, subjects were also asked to state their 
expectation of what the others in their group would harvest in aggregate.
9 After all subjects had 
made their decisions, the monitor collected this information and announced the total harvest for 
that round. With this information, individuals were able to calculate the total harvests by the 
others in their group and their individual payoffs. 
Individual earnings ranged between 11,220 and 22,900 pesos with an average of 15,092 
pesos (about US$6.00).
10 Earnings were paid in cash at the end of each experiment. Each 
experiment lasted about three hours.  Before each experiment began, instructions were read 
aloud by the monitor and several practice rounds that did not count toward final earnings were 
played to familiarize the participants with the experiment.  
 
3. Estimation Technique: A Hierarchical Linear Model  
To formally test how both individual and group effects explain variation in individual harvest 
decisions, we estimated the following hierarchical linear model with random and fixed effects:  
()
00 0 11 1
22 2 33 3




jit j ji j ji
jj i jj i
e
jit jit
xu v u v C o m
u v LowPenalty u v MidPenalty
x Round Com LowPenalty MidPenalty
β β
ββ
β ββ β β ε
=++ + ++
+++ +++
++ + + + +
 [2] 
                                                 
9 Other studies that use the expectations about other group members include Yamagishi and Sato (1986), Komorita 
et al. (1992), Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), and Croson (1998).  
10A day’s wage in the regions where the experiments were conducted varied between 10,000 and 15,000 pesos.    8
In equation [2], we model individual harvest decisions, jit x , for group j, subject i and round t, as a 
function of dummy variables Com, LowPenalty, and MidPenalty that capture changes in 
individual harvests relative to Open Access for the three second-stage institutions. 
e
jit x  is 
individual i’s expectation of the total harvest by the other four members of her group. Round and 
its interactions with each institution are included to control for the effect of time across 
treatments. The coefficients β0 through β8 are the fixed effects.  We vary the coefficients for the 
treatments across both groups and individuals, and thus we estimate a random intercept model. 
For each treatment k, the group-level random effects are ukj, and the individual random effects 
are vkji. The random error, εjit, is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
σ
2.  
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the between- and within-group variances and 
how these vary across the institutions.  There are four between-group variances: 
2
00 var( ) ju u =σ  
for Open Access, 
2
11 var( ) ju u σ =  for Com, 
2
22 var( ) ju u σ =  for Low Penalty, and 
2
33 var( ) ju u σ =  for 
Mid Penalty. The four within-group variances are: 
2
00 var( ) ji v v σ =  for Open Access, 
2
11 var( ) ji v v σ =  for Com, 
2
22 var( ) ji v v σ =  for Low Penalty, and 
2
33 var( ) ji v v σ =  for Mid Penalty. The 
covariances between treatments are assumed to be zero.  
 
4. Results 
The mean harvest in the stage one Open Access baseline treatment (periods 1-10) was 4.75 units 
per person.  This is lower than Nash equilibrium (six units), but higher than the efficient outcome 
(one unit).  This pattern of under-extraction relative to the Nash equilibrium is consistent with 
that observed by Cardenas et al. (2000, 2002) in other Colombian communities using a similar   9
protocol.  In the second stage of each experiment (rounds 11-20), we introduced one of the three 
institutions.  On average, the three institutions were equally effective at promoting conservation 
of the common pool resource: the mean individual harvest in the Com, Low Penalty and Mid 
Penalty treatments were 3.11 (σ=2.46), 3.24 (σ=2.66), and 3.15 (σ=2.68), respectively.  
Obviously, however, such an aggregated analysis likely masks significant differences among 
individuals and groups. 
In Table 1 we report the estimation results of the hierarchical linear model in equation 
[2]. Although the coefficients on the Com, Low Penalty and Mid Penalty fixed effects are 
negative and highly significant, there is no statistically significant difference among them (p = 
0.81), confirming that overall these institutions were equally effective at motivating more 
conservative harvest choices. Note, however, that the coefficients for Round×LowPenalty and 
Round×MidPenalty are both positive and significant (but not statistically different from each 
other, p=0.43). Thus, consistent with the results of Cardenas et al. (2000), the effectiveness of 
the Low Penalty and Mid Penalty regulations deteriorated over time, whereas the effectiveness of 
communication remained stable. <INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Now turn to the random components of our model. Our primary interest lies in examining 
the extent to which these random effects (both within- and between-groups) account for the 
variance in individual harvest decisions across treatments. When examining the variance 
estimates in Table 1, a clear pattern emerges: for the Com treatment, most of the variation is 
explained by between-group effects, whereas the within-group effects dominate in the three non-
communication treatments.  In the Com treatment, the between-group variance (
2
1 0.98 u σ = ) is   10
statistically significant, but the within-group variance (
2
1 0.03 v σ = ) is not.
11  Moreover, this 
within-group variance is quite low, both in absolute terms and relative to the between-group 
variance. Therefore, outcomes in the Com treatment are explained more by differences among 
the groups than by individual differences within these groups. These results suggest that 
communication is effective at coordinating individual strategies within groups (low within-group 
variance), but that these coordinated strategies are quite variable across groups (high between-
group variance). 
Under the Open Access, Low Penalty, and Mid Penalty treatments, matters are much 
different. The between-group variances for these treatments are not significant. In fact, the 
estimated between-group variance under Open Access (
2
0 u σ ) is equal to zero, indicating 
substantial homogeneity among the 36 groups in the first stage. Moreover, the within-group 
variances under Open Access, Low Penalty, and Mid Penalty are much higher than the 
corresponding between-group variances. For example, the within-group variance under Low 
Penalty 
2
2 (3 . 0 1 ) v σ =  is more than 37 times higher than the between-group variance 
2
2 (0 . 0 8 ) u σ = ; 
a similar patter holds for Open Access and Mid Penalty.  Overall, then, we have no statistically 
significant between-group variation under our three non-communication treatments, but highly 
significant within-group variation; the reverse is true for the communication treatment. 
Moreover, the between-group variances under our non-communication treatments are 
much lower than the between-group variance under Com, but the within-group variances are 
much greater.  These results reveal substantial variation in the strategies of individuals within 
                                                 
11  These estimates are unbiased, but we must treat the reported significance tests with caution because the standard 
errors and the Wald Z tests are valid only asymptotically (SAS Institute Inc., 1999). Since the variance estimates 
are unbiased, however, we can draw conclusions about the relative importance of within-group and between-
groups factors, and compare these estimates across treatments.   11
groups when the subjects are not allowed to communicate, but that these strategies are roughly 
replicated across groups so that there is little variation among groups.  
There are, however, noticeable differences in the within-group variances for the non-
communication treatments.  First, the within-group variance estimates for Low Penalty (3.01) 
and Mid Penalty (1.90) are higher than the within-group variance estimate under Open Access 
(0.71). Thus, even though the two regulation treatments produced more conservative strategies 
than under Open Access, it appears that the uncertainty introduced by random monitoring and 
penalties to enforce the harvest quota also increased the within-group variation in individual 
strategies.  
Furthermore, the within-group variation is less under the Mid Penalty regulation than 
under the Low Penalty regulation (3.01 versus 1.90). These treatments are identical, except that 
the Mid Penalty regulation has a fine for exceeding the harvest quota that is over six times that of 
the Low Penalty regulation. Thus, the Mid Penalty regulation involves a much stronger signal of 
the consequences of violating the quota. It appears that this stronger signal served to coordinate 
individual strategies more effectively than the lower penalty in the Low Penalty treatment. It is 
interesting, however, that the Mid Penalty regulation did not produce more conservative choices 
than the Low Penalty regulation. 
  Finally, we also estimated the model in Table 1 without modeling groups as random 
effects.
12 The estimated coefficients of the fixed effects do not change appreciably from those 
reported in Table 1, although their significance levels change slightly due to lower standard 
errors. (Recall that one of the reasons for using hierarchical linear models is to avoid misleading 
standard errors produced by not adjusting for clustered data.)   Therefore, not modeling groups as 
                                                 
12 Estimation results are available upon request.   12
random effects would have led us to the same conclusions about the effectiveness of the second-
stage institutions in promoting more conservative harvests of the common pool resource. 
However, we would have missed our deeper conclusions about how the underlying variation in 
individual strategies within and across groups varies across institutions.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We use a hierarchical linear model to analyze how within-group and between-group variances in 
individual harvest strategies from a common pool resource vary across institutions. From field 
experiments conducted in rural Colombia, we find that communication and weakly-enforced 
regulatory designs yield similar reductions in average harvests from an unregulated open access 
baseline. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but 
these group-coordinated strategies can vary significantly across groups. In contrast, regulatory 
designs yield a high level of within-group variation in individual strategies, but little variation 
across groups.  
These results may have significant implications for the performance of non-binding 
community-based agreements to conserve common pool resources and the role of government 
interventions to do the same. While our results suggest that non-binding agreements are likely to 
be effective at coordinating individual decisions within a group or community, our results also 
suggest that there may be significant variation in the effectiveness and the forms of these verbal 
agreements across similar communities.   
When the government intervenes, however, our results suggest that it can expect that its 
regulations will produce similar conservation efforts across similar communities. Moreover, this 
is bound to be true even when regulations are poorly enforced. On the other hand, our results   13
also suggest that individual decisions within communities may vary quite a bit when regulations 
are implemented. However, a higher unit penalty for violating the harvest quota significantly 
reduced the within-group variation of individual strategies in our regulatory treatments, even 
though this higher penalty did not produce more conservative aggregate harvests. This may 
suggest that within-community variation in individual harvest decisions is a declining function of 
the stringency with which a regulation is enforced. That is, highly variable individual decisions 
within regulated communities may simply be due to the weak enforcement of regulatory controls 
that are characteristic of government interventions in common pool resource dilemmas in the 
developing world.    14
Table 1: Estimation Results from Equation [2] using a Hierarchical Linear Model  
Fixed Effects – Coefficients  Estimate  Standard 
Errors 
Intercept (β0)  3.13*** 0.14 
Com (β1)  -1.00*** 0.35 
Low Penalty (β2)  -1.40*** 0.31 
Mid Penalty (β3)  -1.63*** 0.33 
Expected Harvest of Others (β4)  0.09*** 0.01 
Round (β5)  -0.01 0.01 
Round × Com (β6)  0.01 0.03 
Round × LowPenalty (β7)  0.07** 0.03 
Round × MidPenalty (β8)  0.10*** 0.03 
    
Random Effects – Variances  Estimate  Standard 
Errors 
Between-Group    
Open Access (
2
0 u σ )  0.00 0.00 
Com (
2
1 u σ )  0.98**   0.47 
Low Penalty (
2
2 u σ )  0.08   0.37 
Mid Penalty (
2
3 u σ )  0.39   0.39 
    
Within-Group    
Open Access (
2
0 v σ )  0.71***   0.11 
Com (
2
1 v σ )  0.03   0.13 
Low Penalty (
2
2 v σ )  3.01*** 0.74 
Mid Penalty (
2
3 v σ )  1.90*** 0.51 
    
Within-Individual —(
2 σ )  3.77*** 0.09 
Asterisks reflect p–values:  * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.  N=3600 (36 groups, 5 subjects per group, 20 
rounds).   
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Reviewer’s Appendix: Experiment Instructions
13 
 
Stage 1: Open Access Treatment (Open Access) 
Before we begin, we want to thank you all for accepting this invitation and participating in this 
exercise. The objective of this exercise is to understand how people make decisions related to the 
use of a shared natural resource. All the decisions you make, as well as all the other information 
you will provide us, will remain confidential. We will not divulge your individual decisions to 
any other member of the community, nor to any other person. 
 
Introduction 
The exercise in which you are going to participate can be different from other exercises in which 
members of your community might have participated in the past, therefore, any comment that 
you might have heard about the exercise does not necessarily apply to the version in which you 
will participate. 
 
This exercise is similar to a situation in which a group of people have to make decisions on how 
to use a shared natural resource. For example, a forest, a drinking water source, or a fishing area. 
In this experiment, the resource will be referred as a fishery. 
 
You have been selected to participate in a group of 5 people. Today, there are 3 groups 
participating at the same time. However, each group is independent and the decisions of the other 
groups do not affect the decisions of your group. Each group will be differentiated by the color 
of the sheets used during the exercise.  
 
In this exercise you will earn money depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
members of your group. The reason why we use money in this exercise is to represent real life 
situations in which your economic decisions will bring yourself monetary consequences. You 
will play several rounds equivalent, for example, to periods such as years, months, or fishing 
seasons. 
 
In each round, you will earn a number of points that will be equivalent to a number of pesos. At 
the end of the exercise, we will sum the total number of pesos earned in all the rounds, we will 
round the total earned, and we will personally hand that to you in cash. 
 
We will now explain how to participate in the exercise. Please pay a lot of attention to the 
instructions. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to make better decisions in the 
exercise. Please, remain seated and do not speak with other participants. If you have a question, 
raise you hand. The assistant will answer your question in private. 
 
Earnings Table 
We will now hand out the EARNINGS TABLE which contains all the information you will need 
to make your decisions in this exercise.  
 
                                                 
13 Thanks to Juan Camilo Osorio for translating the instructions from Spanish to English.   18
All participants have the same EARNINGS TABLE that you do. The numbers in the table are 
points equivalent to the pesos you can earn in each round, depending on both what you decide to 
extract and the decisions made by others in your group.  
 
In each round you have to decide how many units of the resource you will extract. We will call 
your decision “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION.” These units correspond to the columns 1 to 9 
in the EARNING TABLE. In this exercise, each participant can extract a maximum of 9 units, 
and a minimum of 1. 
 
In the EARNINGS TABLE, the decisions of the other members of your group correspond to the 
column “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which will be a number between 4 and 36. 
This number is the sum of the units extracted by the other members of the group. In other words, 
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is equal to: the total extraction of the whole group, 
minus the amount you extracted. When you make your decision, you will not know the decisions 
made by the other members of your group.  
 
Once all participants hand in their decisions, we will sum all the levels of extraction and 
will announce the group’s TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION. With this information you will 
be able to calculate the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the 
“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”. 
 
Let’s see some examples so that you can understand how to use the EARNINGS TABLE. 
 
Imagine you decide that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 units, and that the other 
members of the group extract 4 units each.  We will announce that the TOTAL level of 
extraction is 20 units. Since you decided to extract 4, you can calculate the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”. In this case, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF 
OTHERS” is 20 – 4 = 16 units. Thus, as seen in the table, your earnings will be 859.  
 
In the previous example all the members of the group picked the same level of extraction. 
However, each person can pick a different number. For example, if you choose 4 and the other 
members of the group extract 2, 3, 7 and 8, we will announce that the TOTAL level of extraction 
is 24. Given the fact that you decided to extract 4, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF 
OTHERS” will be 20. In other words, the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION (24) minus 
“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (4). In this case, as seen on the table, your earnings will be 
754. 
 
The EARNINGS TABLE has an additional table called “Average of others”. This column 
indicates you the average decision of your group for a determined level. For example, if the 
others extract 8, this means that the average amount extracted per person is 2. Instead, if the 
others extract 20, the average amount extracted per person is 5.  
 
Take a few seconds to look at the EARNINGS TABLE and understand how it works. If you have 
any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to you.  
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Decision Card 
I will now explain how you will inform us in each round your level of extraction. In each round 
















In each round you will have to write: 
- The number of the round, which will be announced by us. 
-“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”, in other words, how many units will you extract, which in 
this case will be a number between 1 and 9.  
-You also have to write what you think the other members of your group will extract. 
 
This is the sum of the levels of extraction that you think the other 4 members of your group will 
extract. This sum is a number between 4 and 36. Remember that when you make your decision 
you do not know what the others are choosing. However, we want to know how much you think 
the others will extract. For example, if you think that two people will choose 3 and the other two 
5, then, what you think the others will extract is 16 (3 +3+ 5 + 5).  
 
What you write on the level of extraction of others will not affect your earnings, either if it is 
equal or different to what actually happened. However, we are interested to know what you are 
thinking about the level of extraction of the others when you make your choice. 
 
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, we will pick up the 5 
participants’ cards and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction. Once we announce the 
total extraction of the group you will be able to calculate the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION 
OF OTHERS.” With this information and your level of extraction, you will be able to calculate 
how much you earned by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE.  
 
It is very important that you remember that your decisions are private and that you can not show 






Participant Number:   
Round Number:   
My level of extrac1tion: 
(a number between 1 – 9):   
How much do you think 
others will extract? 
(a number between 4 – 36): 
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Calculation sheet 
Each one of you will receive a calculation sheet with which you record your decisions and 
earnings. Please write your participant number in the calculation sheet. This is the same number 
that is written in the decision cards.  
 
Let’s see how to use the calculation sheet by looking at an example. Suppose you decided to 
extract 4 units. In consequence, you have to write 4 under column A of the calculation sheet, as 
shown in the example. You should also write this number in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
in the Decision Card .You are writing your decision in two places, in the Decision Card, which 
you will hand in back to us, and in the calculations sheet. Please, check that you have written the 
same number in the two sheets before you hand in the decision card.  
 
After all the members of the group have finished taking their decisions, we will pick up the cards 
of the 5 participants and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction.  
 
Suppose the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 20 units. You should write 20 in the 
column B in the calculations sheet. In order to calculate accurately the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” you should subtract Column A (“MY LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) from Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”) You should write 
the result in Column C (“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”) In our example, the 
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is 16 (20 – 4.) 
 
In order to calculate your earnings, you should use the EARNINGS TABLE. In this case, given 
that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 and the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” 
is 16, then your earnings will be 859. This is the information you should write in column D.   
 
Practice rounds 
Before we begin the exercise we will do some practice rounds. The decisions that you take in 
these practice rounds would not affect your earnings today. 
 
The first practice round will be done altogether. First, write the number of the round in the 
decision card, in this case (P) of practice. After that, looking at the EARNINGS TABLE suppose 
that each one of you picked 5. Write this in the decision card and in Column A of the earnings 
sheet. You should also write in the decision card what you think the other members of your 
group will extract. In this case, it is 20, because we know that all of them picked 5. Remember, 
when we begin the real exercise, you will not know the exact number of extraction of the other 
members while you will be picking your level of extraction. In the next rounds you will write 
what you think the others will extract.  
 
Given that all the members of the group picked 5 in this example, the total level of extraction for 
the group is 25. Each one should write now 25 under Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) in the calculations sheet. 
 
Now subtract “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (5) from the “TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION” (25). In other words, column B minus Column A. This operation is equal to 20. 
This number is the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which you should write in   21
Column C. Using the number in Column A, “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION,” and the number 
under column C, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, you should use the earnings 
table to determine your earnings for this round. In this case, your earnings will be 790. Write 
your earnings in column D. 
 
We did this example and the previous one supposing that everyone picked the same level of 
extraction. However, when you make your decision, you may choose the level of extraction that 
you want by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE. Are there any questions? 
 
Let’s continue with the next practice round. First, write down the round’s name in the decision 
card, in this case (P) of practice. Now, each one of you has to decide your level of extraction 
using the EARNINGS TABLE. Write it down in the decision card and in Column A in the 
calculations sheet. Before you hand in the decision card, check that the number in column A is 
equal to the one you wrote in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” in the decision card. You 
should also write in the decision card the level of extraction that you believe the other members 
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Stage 2 – Communication Treatment (Com) 
 
We now will begin the second part of this exercise. This part is very similar to the previous one, 
with the difference that in the next rounds you will be able to communicate with the other 
members of your group. 
 
At the beginning of each round, before you decide how much you will extract, you will have 5 
minutes to discuss the exercise with the other members of your group. During these 5 minutes, 
you will be able to discuss with them anything related with the exercise. Before the discussion 
round begins, turn your calculations sheet upside down and leave it on the table. After 5 minutes, 
the discussion will come to an end and you will return to your seat to decide privately what your 
level of extraction decision will be.  
 
 
Stage 2 – Mid Penalty Treatment (Mid Penalty) 
 (These are the instructions for the medium penalty of 165.  The instructions for the low penalty 
treatment are identical, except that the penalty for each additional unit extracted is 27). 
 
We will now begin the second part of this exercise. This part is very similar to the previous one, 
with the difference that in the next rounds we will establish a regulation.  The objective of this 
regulation is to make all participants of your group extract 2 units. 
 
In order to promote that people do not extract more than 2 units of the resource, we are going to 
impose a penalty of 165 points for each additional unit extracted. The table that we will be 
handing out summarizes the total penalties that result from each level of extraction.  
 




My level of 
extraction  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Penalty  0 0  165 330 495 660 825  990  1155
 
You will have to pay the penalty only if you are inspected when extracting more than 2 units of 
the resource. In other words, you can extract more than 2 units, but if you are inspected, you will 
have to pay the penalty. However, it will be very difficult to inspect the decisions of all the 
members of the group. 
 
In consequence, once each person decides their level of extraction (a number between 1 and 9) 
and has handed in the decision card, we will randomly pick who will be inspected.  
 
In order to decide who will be inspected, we will take a ballot from a bag containing 5 ballots 
with the participants’ numbers on them, and 5 other blank ballots. 
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(Show the ballots) 
 
This implies that for each round you have ONE chance in 10 of being inspected. If your number 
is selected and you extracted more than 2 units of the resource, then you will have to pay the 
penalty for every additional unit. Nobody else will ever know the result of such inspection. If a 
blank ballot is selected, no one will be inspected. 
 
(Practice picking the ballot) 
 
In each round we will only take one ballot. The selected ballot will be returned to the bag. This 
means that the result of the inspection in this round will not affect the result of the next one.  In 
this way, someone can be inspected more than one time during the exercise. It is also possible 
that you never get inspected. 
 
 
Let’s make some examples: 
For example, if you extract 5 units of the resource, your level of extraction is 3 units greater than 
the permitted level of 2 units. 
If your number is randomly selected from the bag, then you will be inspected. Since you 
extracted 5 units, the penalty will be 495, as can be seen in the penalty table (5–2=3 and 
3*165=495). In consequence, we will have to subtract 495 from your earnings.  
If a blank ballot is selected nobody will be inspected and we will follow on to the next 
round. If you are not inspected, you will not have to pay any penalty. 
 
Another example: 
If you extract 2 units, your level of extraction is equal to the level permitted.  If your number is 
randomly selected from the bag, you will be inspected. Given the fact that your level of 
extraction is equal to the permitted level, then you will not have to pay the penalty. If a blank 
ballot is selected, nobody will be inspected and we will pass to the next round. If you are not 
inspected, you will not have to pay the penalty. 
 
Calculation sheet 
The calculation sheet for these rounds is very similar to the one used in the previous rounds, but 
includes some changes.  
Before we begin, please write your participant’s number in the new calculation sheet. 
Columns A, B and C are used as in previous rounds. In column D you must write your 
earnings before you know if you will be inspected. Now, there are two additional columns. In 
column E you must write whether you were inspected or not in each round. Write YES or NO. In 
column F we will write the total value of the penalty you will have to pay if you are inspected. If 
you were not inspected, please write 0 in this column. In the last column, column G, you can 
write your earnings after the inspection.  Earnings after the inspection are calculated subtracting 
the value of the penalty (column F) from the earnings before the inspection (column D). If you 
were not inspected, or your penalty is 0, your earnings (column G) will be exact to what was 
written in column D (My earnings before the inspection).  
 
Let’s see some examples:   24
Suppose that your level of extraction was 5 units and the total level of extraction was 17 units. 
Write this information in the corresponding columns as in the previous rounds. In this case, level 
of extraction of the others is 12 (column C) and your earnings will be 1021, before the 
inspection. 
 
If your number is randomly selected from the bag, then you will be inspected. Write “YES” in 
column E. Since you extracted 5 units, the penalty will be 495, as you can see in the penalty table 
(5–2 =3 and 3*165=495.) Write 495 in column F (total penalty value.) In consequence, your total 
earnings for this round will be 1021 (column D) – 495 (column F) = 526. Write 526 in the last 
column (My earnings after the inspection, column G.) 
 
If a blank ballot is selected and nobody is inspected we will pass the following round. You will 
not have to pay any penalty. Write NO in column E, 0 in column F (penalty value) and write 
your earnings before the inspection (column D) in column G (earnings after the inspection.) 
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EARNINGS TABLE  
  My level of extraction   
Level of 
extraction 




4  900  996  1087  1172 1252  1326  1395 1458  1516 1.0 
5  882  976  1064  1146 1223  1295  1361 1421  1476 1.3 
6  864  955  1040  1120 1194  1263  1326 1384  1436 1.5 
7  846  934  1017  1094 1165  1231  1292 1347  1396 1.8 
8  829  914  994  1068 1137  1200  1258 1310  1357 2.0 
9  811  893  970  1042 1108  1168  1223 1273  1317 2.3 
10  793  873  947  1016 1079  1137  1189 1236  1277 2.5 
11  775 852  923 989  1050  1105  1154  1198  1237  2.8 
12  757 831  900 963  1021  1073  1120  1161  1197  3.0 
13  739 811  877 937  992  1042  1086  1124  1157  3.3 
14  721 790  853 911  963  1010  1051  1087  1117  3.5 
15  703 769  830 885  934 978  1017  1050  1077  3.8 
16  686 749  807 859  906 947  983  1013  1038  4.0 
17  668 728  783 833  877 915  948  976  998  4.3 
18  650 708  760 807  848 884  914  939  958  4.5 
19  632 687  736 780  819 852  879  901  918  4.8 
20  614 666  713 754  790 820  845  864  878  5.0 
21  596 646  690 728  761 789  811  827  838  5.3 
22  578 625  666 702  732 757  776  790  798  5.5 
23  560 604  643 676  703 725  742  753  758  5.8 
24  543 584  620 650  675 694  708  716  719  6.0 
25  525 563  596 624  646 662  673  679  679  6.3 
26  507 543  573 598  617 631  639  642  639  6.5 
27  489 522  549 571  588 599  604  604  599  6.8 
28  471 501  526 545  559 567  570  567  559  7.0 
29  453 481  503 519  530 536  536  530  519  7.3 
30  435 460  479 493  501 504  501  493  479  7.5 
31  417 439  456 467  472 472  467  456  439  7.8 
32  400 419  433 441  444 441  433  419  400  8.0 
33  382 398  409 415  415 409  398  382  360  8.3 
34  364 378  386 389  386 378  364  345  320  8.5 
35  346 357  362 362  357 346  329  307  280  8.8 
36  328 336  339 336  328 314  295  270  240  9.0 
 
 
 
 
 